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くAbstract)
Financial institutions in Japan have recently been suffering from rather seri-
ous problems of accumulating bad loans which could be comparable to those 
experienced during the Showa Kinyu Kyoko， i.e.， financial crisis in the late 
1920s. A lot of argument has already been done with respect to the bankruptcy 
or rescue proceedings for individual cases of troubled financial institutions. 
However， itis regrettable that not much argument has been done yet with 
respect to the more fundamental and important question about the current 
prudential policy itse1f. That is， how can we attain a safe and sound financial 
system in J apan? 
The purpose of this paper is to review criticalIy current prudential policy in 
Japan and to make a proposal about the new framework ofthe financial regula-
tion and the supervision. The contents of this paper are as follows: after a brief 
introduction， inSection 2 we critically review the current regulatory and super-
visory agencies in Japan and make a proposal about establishing the Financial 
System Agency. In Section 3 and 4 we analyze the current problems of the ac-
counting system and the bankruptcy procedures for banks in J apan respective-
ly and argue how we could improve them in the near future. 
1. Introduction 
Financial institutions in J apan have recently been suffering from serious 
management problems which could be comparable to those experienced during 
the financial crisis in the early Showa period (the late 1920s). Their lending be-
haviour have been significantly restrained because of enormous amount of bad 
loans1) and， as a resuIt， the Japanese real economy has been negatively 
influenced to continue stagnant conditions.2) Therefore， there could be no ob-
jections to the argument such that the problems of those bad loans should be 
solved as soon as possible. 
However， once we start the argument concerning the bankruptcy proceed-
ings of specific cases such as the Tokyo Kyowa and the Anzen Credit Unions， 
whose failures led to the establishment of the Tokyo Kyodo Bank， and the 
Real Estate Spcializing Institutions (so-called Jusen) which have been the focus 
The original version of this paper (in Japanese) was presented at the fal meeting of 
the Japanese Finance Association (Kinyu Gakkai) in October 1995. 1 would like to 
thank Profe明orToshiki Jinushi for his valuable comments. 
AIso 1 would like to thank Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and 
Finance for its financial support to this research project. 
of serious conflicts of interests between city banks and regional banks on one 
hand and finaIicial institutions for agricu1ture， forestry， and fishery on the 
other hand， we instantaneouly face a lot of controversy about the burden-shar-
ings among related entities. Meanwhile， there have not been many discussions 
about the more fundamental and important questions of the Japanese finan-
cia1 system itself yet; that is， what would be the more desirable J apanese finan-
cial system in the near future and how could we attain it? 
Before starting the arguments concerning the current prudential policy in 
J apan， we would like to confirm the following basic principles about the 
prudential policy in genera1. 
First， the purpose of the prudential policy is to maintain a sound and stable 
financial system. In order to achieve that purpose， it is very important to set up 
the environment in which market disciplines could prevail. In Japan， however， 
the Ministry of Finance (hereinafter referred to as “MOF") has been excerciz・
ing various regulations so as to restrict competitions among financial institu-
tions and thereby to protect them from any bankruptcies. As a resu1t， those 
financial institutions which were inefficient and/or were exposed too much 
risks continue to survive. We argue that zero failures of financial institutions 
under such counter-competitive regulations are not desirable and should not 
be considered as the purpose of the prudential policy. 
Second， the soundness and stability of the financial system can not be at・
tained by market disciplines alone because of market failures. Therefore， it is 
necesssary to introduce some types of regulation and supervision such as a) cap-
ital ratio requirements， risk management requirement， and monitorings and 
on-site examinations (i.e.， ex-ante measures)， and b) deposit insurance system， 
bankruptcy procedures， and the so-called “Lender of last Resort" function by 
a central bank (i.e.， ex-post measures). It should be noted that there are c1ear 
distinctions between the traditional counter-competitive regulations and the 
above-indicated types of regulation and supervision whose purposes are to 
maintain a sound and stable financia1 system. 
Third， more prudent behaviour of financial institutions can be attained 
through the public disc10sure of information concerning their management. 
Based on such information， shareholders and depositors can make selec 
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bankruptcy proceedings. From many examples in Japan and overseas coun-
tries， it is obvious for troubled financial institutions to make a last gamble in 
order to avoid bankruptcies and to increase ultimately the amount of problem 
loans. At the present moment， however，there does not exist the uniform rule 
concerning the bankruptcy proceedings for financial institutions in Japan. 
Therefore， it is urgent to make c1ear rules concerning the bankruptcy proceed-
ings and to adopt corrective actions against roubled financial instituions as 
soon as possible. 
1. Financial Regulation and Supervision in Japan 
1. Regulatory and Supervisory Agencies 
(1) The Ministry of Finance 
The MOF has the dominant power with respect to the financial regulation 
and supervision in Japan. According to the Ministry of Finance Law， MOF is
responsible for the following 7 areas of the administration， i.e.， a)treasury， b)
currency， c)finance， d)foreign exchange， e)securities transactions，ηmint， 
and g) printing. As shown in Chart 1， the organization of the headquarter of 
the MOF consists of the Minister's Secretariat and 7 bureaus such as the Budg-
et Bureau， the Tax Bureau， the Customs and Tariffs Bureau， the Financial 
Bureau， the Securities Bureau， the Banking Bureau， and the International 
Finance Bureau. Besides， aspart of its headquarter， there are some special insti-
tutions such as the Mint Bureau， the Print Bureau， and the Institute for Fiscal 
and Monetary Studies. Also the National Tax Administration is an affiliated 
agency to the MOF. 
Among those Bureaus of the MOF， the Banking Bureau， the Securities 
Bureau， and the International Finance Bureau play an important role as regula-
tory and supervisory agencies over various financial institutions. For example， 
the Banking Bureau is responsible for the supervision over most of the private 
financial institutions such as city banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks， 
regional banks， second-tier regional banks， and Shinkin banks. Also its Insur-
ance Department is responsible for the supervision over insurance companies. 
According to Okura Zaimu Kyokai [1993]， which is closely related to the 
MOF， the situation is described as follows; 
“Financial institutions are under the supervision of the Banking Bureau in 
the sense that they have to acquire entry licences of the Banking Bureau 
and are regulated by the Banking Law and other speciallaws. Such regula-
tion extends over rather wide area such as interest rates setings， asets and 
liabilities management and so on." 
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The Securities Bureau is responsible for the supervision over the Stock Ex-
changes and securities companies under the Securities and Exchange Law 
(Shoken Torihiki Ho) and watches securities markets as the supervisor. The In-
ternational Finance Bureau， inturn， is responsible for the supervision over cap-
it叫movementsto and from overseas under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
Trade Control Law (GaikokルKawaseoyobi Gaikoku-Boeki Kanri Ho). Ac-
cordingly， financial institutions which engage in foreign exchange operations 
and international finance are under the direction of the International Finance 
Bureau. Besides， the Finance Inspection Department of the Minister's 
Secretariat conducts the on-site examination of financia1 institutions and the 
Supervisory Committee for Securities Transactions etc is a watcher of securi-
ties transactions in general. 
As has been indicated， the MOF isthe major supervisory agency over 
almost a11 the Japanese financial institutions. But， the exceptions are credit un-
ions which are under the direction of prefectura1 governments. It shou1d a1so 
be noted that labour credit associations and agricultural-and fishery-coopera幽
tives are under the additional directions of the Ministry of Labour and the Mi・
nistry of Agriculture， Forestry， and Fishery as well as the direction of the 
MOF. 
(2) The Bank of J apan 
The Bank of J apan (hereinafter referred to as “BOJ' ')is partly responsible 
for the financia1 supervision and regulation in Japan. The BOJ itself argues 
that its two objectives are the maintenance of the va1ue of the currency and the 
maintenance and fostering of the credit system as stipulated in Artic1e 1 ofthe 
Bank of Japan Law (Nihon Ginko Ho). The former indicates the price stabili-
ty as the fina1 t町getof the macro monetary policy and the latter indicates the 
maintenance of a safe and sound financia1 system as the target of the so-ca1ed 
prudentia1 policy. 
The activities the BOJ engages in so as to maintain a safe and sound finan-
cial system are three-fold (Chart 2). First of al， the Credit and Management 
Department of the BOJ monitors the daily operations of financial institutions 
and its Bank-Supervision Department conducts on-site examinations of those 
institutions. When conducting on-site examinations， the BOJ staf has tradi-
tional1y been paying c10se attention to the soundness of loan assets in order to 
eva1uate the capita11evel of a financia1 institution. More recently， however， the 
BOJ staff has a1so come to pay c10se attention to various risks such as interest 
rate risks， foreign exchange risks， and systemic risks. It should be noted that 
the supervision by the BOJ is different in purpose from the inspection by the 
MOF. The BOJ exercises its authority as the Lender of Last Resort and gives 
expert advices after having closely surveyed the management situation of each 
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financial institution. On the other hand， the MOF inspections are conducted in 
order to detect violations of the Banking Law and the Securities and Exchange 
Law and so on. Despite such differences， however， the BOJ and the MOF share 
the common policy objective of maintaining a safe and sound financial system. 
Second， the BOJ facilitates settlements by issuing banknotes and transfer幽
ring funds between current deposit accounts lodged in it by private financial in-
stitutions. Faced with rapid developments in computer technology and data 
processingぉ well備員nancialderegulation and the progress of financial 
globalization， the BOJ has been making its efforts to enhance thee血ciencyand
reliability of Japan's settlememt system， soas to harmonize them with interna-
tional standards and practices. In particular， the BOJ has launched an on-line 
settlement network called BOJ-NET， which provides an electronic-based facili-
ty for operations such as current account transfers， and registration and book-
entry for Government securities. Thus the BOJ plays an important role in the 
smooth functioning of the clearing and settlement system in Japan. The Finan-
cial and Payment System Department and the Information and Computer Sys-
tem Department of the BOJ are responsible for the role. 
Third， the BOJ acts部 theLender of Last Resort. When the possibility of a 
financial institution becoming insolvent is considered to pose an important 
threat to the credibility of the financial system as a whole， which might perhaps 
trigger a collapse in confidence， a central bank would be necessitated to take 
preventive measures by extending credit to such financial institutions. The BOJ 
is ready to perform such a role as the Lender of Last Resort in c10sely com-
municating with the MOF and the Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Finan-
cial and Payment System Department and the Credit and Market Management 
Department of the BOJ are responsible for the Lender of Last Resort func-
tions. 
It should be noted that the BOJ is definitely controled by the Banking 
Bureau of the MOF under the current Bank of J apan Law. Accordingly， the 
BOJ is under the strong influence by the MOF in pursuing the above-indicated 
roles related to the prudential policy， inparticular the dealings with bankrupt 
financial institutions. 
(3) The Deposit Insurance Corporation 
The Deposit Insurance System in Japan was created under the Deposit In-
surance Act (hereinafter referred to as “DIA")， which was promulgated and 
enforced in April1971. DIA stipulates that the aim of the System is to protect 
depositors with a view to maintaining the stability of the financial system， by 
either making insurance payments to depositors in the event of the suspension 
of deposit repayments， orextending “Financial Assistance" to facilitate merg-
ers or acquisitions of failing financial institutions. Financial institutions which 
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are legaIly obligated to participate in the Deposit Insurance System include aIl 
the foIlowing types of financial institutions with headquarters in J apan: a) 
banks (city banks， regiona1 banks， second-tier regional banks， trust banks， 
long-term credit banks)， b) Shinkin banks， c)credit cooperatives， d)labor 
banks. Government-related financial institutions and Japanese branches of for-
eign banks are not covered by this System. 
It should be noted that the insurance relationship arises automatically 
among the Deposit Insurance Corporation， financial institutions， and their 
depositors when financial institutions accept insured deposits. The following 
deposits and other liabilities of member institutions are insured under the Sys欄
tem: a) Deposits， b)InstaIlment savings， c)Money-in-trust whose principal has 
been guaranteed， specificaIly jointly managed designated money trusts， and 
loan trusts. 
The Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “DIC") was 
created in July 1971 under the provisions ofthe DIA for the purpose of operat-
ing the Deposit Insurance System. The Corporation was capitalized at 1455 mil-
lion， of which the Government and the BOJ subscribed to I150 million respec-
tively. The remaining I155 mi1lion was provided by private financial institu-
tions. 
The DIC's decision-making body is the Management Committee which con-
sists of the Govenor (concurrently， the Deputy Governor of the BOJ)， the Ex-
ecutive Director， and the other six members. Those members are appointed by 
the Governor with the approval of the Minister of Finance from among per-
sons with expertise in financial fields. At present， the Chairman of the Federル
tion of Bankers Association of J apan and other representatives of the financial 
communities are serving on this Committee. 
The major functions of DIC include the collection of insurance premiums， 
payment of insurance claims， execution of “Financial Assistance" and the 
management of funds. 
Member institutions must pay premiums to the Deposit Insurance Corpora.欄
tion within 3 months of the beginning of each business year. The premium 
amount to be paid is calculated by mu1tiplying the premium rate (currently 
0.012%) and the total balance of insured deposits held by a financial institu-
tion at the end of the preceding business year. 
All surpluses of the Corporation derived from insurance premiums and 
other revenues are accumulated i 
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2. Financial Regulations 
The financial regulation and supervision in Japan has traditionally been 
characterized with a) functiona1 separation of private financial institutions， b)
interest rate regulation， and c) regulation over international transactions， alof 
which are to restrict competitive forces. However， most of those regulations 
that restricted competitive forces have been gradually abolished in the process 
of financialliberalization and internationalization since the late 1970s. 
Functional S句parationof Private Financial Institutions 
The first characteristic has been the functional separation of private finan-
cial institutions. The greater role of the financial system within the nationa1 
economy can be observed in some other countries than in J apan， but what has 
really been characteristic with the J apanese financial system is the fact that the 
rather strict allocation of individual functions among different categories of 
financial institutins has been observed. Such a110cation of financial functions 
have been seen in the separation between long-term finance and short-term 
finance， the separation between deposit banks and trust banks， and the sep町a・
tion between banks and securities companies. 
However， regulations concerning the business areas of financial institutions 
have been liberalized in recent ye町s.For example， banks have been allowed to 
handle many securities activities， starting with the over-the-counter sa1e of 
government bonds in April 1983. A wide range of banking institutions from 
city banks to credit co-operatives are now permitted to handle those bonds. 
Also， dea1ings in public bonds by banks started in 1984 and the scope of bank困
ing institutions which are permitted to deal in those bonds has been gradually 
broadened since then. Meanwhile， in1984 securities companies developed， 
through tie-up with Shinkin banks， a new financial instrument which linked 
medium-term government bond funds with bank deposits. With such financia1 
innovation， the medium開termgovernment bond funds became a defacto sett1e-
ment account， even though sett1ements must be done through an ordinary 
bank deposit account. As for the segmentation of the banking systern， the 
demarcations which separated various specialized banks have gradua11y and 
effectively been reduced. 
Although there stil remain fundamenta1 regulations that divide institution-
al categories， the further restructuring of the Japanese financial system has 
been seen recent1y. For example， the Financia1 System Committee of the Finan-
cia1 System Research Council， an advisory body to the Minister of Finance， 
published a report entit1ed “On a New Japanese Financial System" in June 
1991. In this report the Committee critically analyzed the traditional Japanese 
financial system from viewpoints such as access for customers， internationa1 
standards， and the maintenance of financial stability and co 
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mutual entries among individual financial categories in the form of separate 
subsidiaries would be the appropriate approach towards a new financial sys-
tem. Subsequent1y， Law Concerning the Reform of the Financial System 
(Kinyu Seido Kaikaku Ho) was enacted in June 1992 and it became possible 
for ordinary banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks， and securities compa幽
nies to set up wholly-owned subsidiaries in the designated financia1 categories， 
starting from April 1993. A1though there are st迎 impo此組tr田trictionsin 
terms of type of business which banks or securities companies engage in (e.g. 
banks are not a110wed to engage in stock-broking) and relatively strict firewalls 
exist between parents and subsidiaries， securities subsidiaries formed by city 
banks， long-term credit banks， trust banks and so on as well as trust bank sub-
sidiaries formed by securities companies have gradually started operations 
since July and October 1993 respectively. 
It should be noted that additiona1 regulations that restrict competitive 
forces have been enforced in the form of entries licence and branch admittance 
within individua1 categories of financia1 institutions. For example， a new entry 
to ordinary banking busin白ssuch as city banks and regiona1 banks has never 
been admitted by the MOF with only a few exceptiona1 cases.3) Besides，banks 
have had to get permissions with respect to new branches and their number 
and locations have been left to the MOF's discretion.4) Furthermore， banks 
have had to report to the MOF about newly developed financia1 instruments be-
fore their sales and in fact the MOF has not admitted or delayed their sales and 
thereby restricted market competitions.S) 
Interest Rate Regulation 
The second characteristic of the Japannese financia1 system has been relat-
ed to interest rate regulation. The first agreement on regulating deposit interest 
rate with enforcement provisions was set in 1918. The motivation for banks to 
establish such agreement was to avoid a banking crisis as a result of interest 
rate competition in gathering deposits. There existed a strong fear that such 
competition might have weakened the soundness of banks. 
In December 1947， the Temporary Inter白tRate Adjustment Law (Ri巧i
Kinri Tyosei Ho) was promulgated and implemented. Under the Law， cei1ings 
of deposit rates were strictly observed and were set at artificial1y lower level 
than market rates， while those of lending rates were rather loose. As a result， 
banks could have maintained ample margins between them for a long period 
oftime. However， starting from the late 1980s， deposit rates were steadi1y liber-
alized. At first， CDs with libera1ized interest rates were introduced in 1979. 
Large-denomination time deposits bearing market rates and MMCs were in-
troduced in 1985， sma11圃denominationMMCs in 1989， and restrictions on mini-
mum account and maturity of such deposits were gradua11y rel砿 edthereafter. 
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In June 1993， interest rates on time deposits became virtually free of any regula-
tion. In 1994， interest rates on liquid deposits were liberalized except those on 
current deposits， i.e.， checking account， whose rates remain regulated to be at 
0%. 
Meanwhile， the commissions for stock transactions were regulated as the ex幽
ceptiona1 case to the so-ca11ed Anti-Monopoly law (Dokω'en-Kinsi Ho) in 
1948 and such fixed commissions system a110wed securities companies im-
portant sources of revenues for a long period of time. However， since 1991 the 
liberalization of the fixed commission system for stock transactions were dis-
cussed and in 1994 the commissions for the large-denomination transactions 
which exceed n bi1lion were libera1ized. 
Foreign Exchange Control 
The third characteristic of the Japannese financia1 system has been related 
to foreign exchange control. Rather strict control of foreign exchange during 
the high growth period in the 1960s meant that there was a segmentation be-
tween domestic and foreign financia1 markets. Since 1973 when Japan moved 
to the flexible exchange rate system， however， such regulation concerning 
forein exchange control was gradually eased in line with the international trend 
of liberalizing capital movement across borders. 
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law was fully revised in 
1980 and the basic principles concerning the international capita1 movement 
was changed from one of“prohibition" to one of“freely allowed" though 
regulations in case of emergency. In May 1984， a report by the Jomt Japan-
U.S. Ad Hoc Group on YenjDollar Exchange Rate， Financia1 and Capita1 
Market Issues (so-called YenjDollar Committee) suggested a number of 
deregulations with respect to both the raising and investing of funds by banks 
and other entities so as to promote the internationalization of the yen. Inc1ud幽
ed among them were the removal of limits on the oversold spot foreign ex-
change positions of banks (i.e.， yen conversion limits)， the liberalization of 
Euroyen trading， and the elimination of the so-called “real demand rule" for 
forward exchange transactions between banks and their customers. All such 
measures contributed to expanding internationa1 financia1 transactions. The 
lifting of yen conversion limits resulted in expanding Euroyen interbank 
transactions and Eurodollar transactions wi由 foreignexchange swaps， which 
in turn contributed most significantly to increased arbitrage between domestic 
interbank and open markets. 
As has been stated， the traditional financial administration in Japan was 
characterized with various kinds of regulations whose purposes were to restrict 
competitive forces in financia1 markets and to prot民tthe weakest financia1 in-
stitutions from fa1ling into bankruptcy by allowing them to attain enough 
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revenues to survive. The traditional style of the Japanese financial administra-
tion during the high-growth period was often metaphorically described as 
“Convoyed Fleet of Vessels Administration (Ooso Sendan Oyosei， hereinafter 
referred to as“GSG")." However， under the circumstances of financial 
deregulation and internationalization in the late 1970s， Such traditional type 
administration was forced to change since it became rather difficu1t to maintain 
various regulations restricting competitive forces and， asa resu1t， there ap-
peared some financial institutions that could not survive. In that sense， 
“GSG" has been gradually changing and in fact the MOF established the 
Deposit Insurance System in 1971 in anticipating that the traditional type finan-
cial administration would not be maintained in the future. 
It should be noted here that the framework of the financial regulation and 
supervision in J apan has not been changed at al in spite of those changes in 
financial circumstances. Since “GSG" should be substituted by the prudential 
policy based on market disciplines， agencies responsible for the financial regu-
lation and supervision， i.e.， the MOF and the BOJ， must also be changed ac-
cordingly. 
3. Quest for New Regulatory Framework 
We would like to make boldly a tentative proposal concerning the new 
framework of the financial regulation and supervision in Japan (Chart 3). 
First， the Financial System Agency (FSA) is to be newly established by in-
tegrating functions of the Banking Bureau， the Securities Bureau， the Interna-
tional Finance Bureau， and the Supervisory Committee for Securities Transac-
tions and so on of the present MOF. The FSA should be separated from and be 
independent of the MOF and FSA's major functions are a) planning of the 
financial system， b)supervision concerning sound management of financial in-
stitutions (e.g.， capital ratio and risk control)， and c) international coordina-
tion of the prudential supervisions. 
The necessity of the newly established FSA arises from the fact that the 
present MOF has been very deeply involved with the traditional “GSG" over 
financial institutions. Each financial bureaus of the MOF performed a role of 
protecting and promoting financial industries as wel1 as a role of regulating 
and supervising those industries. Consequently， financial institutions expected 
the MOF of al kinds of protections against severe competitions. Therefore， in
order to introduce the prudential policy based on the market disciplines， 
phi1osophies concerning the importance of market disciplines must be recog-
nized by both the MOF and financial institutions. In that sense， there should 
be strict distinctions between the present MOF and the newly established FSA. 
Another important argument for establishing the FSA isthat the segment-
ed barriers among various financia1 businesses such as banks， securities compa-
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nies， trusts，and insurance companies， would be abolished in the future and， as
a result， overall harmonization of various financial businesses are expected to 
proceed gradually. Meanwhile， the present MOF ischaracterized with sharp 
distinctions among individual bureaus and with no significant integration of ad-
ministration of those bureaus and in fact would be very dificult to cope with 
future circumstances. Therefore， itis necessary for the FSA to be an entity 
which is responsible for supervising financial services industries as a whole and 
for watching al kinds of risks stemming from various financial services. 
Second， the BOJ is to be a central bank which should be responsible for 
maintaining the price stability as its sole objective. For that purpose， the Bank 
of Japan Law should be revised in such a way as to assure the central bank in-
dependence to the BOJ. Of course， the BOJ should continue to perform such 
functions as the Lender of Last Resort， management of the payment system， 
and monitoring of financial institutions which have deposits-loans transactions 
with the BOJ. However， the BOJ is not independently responsible for those 
functions， but should perform those functions with the co-operation of the 
FSA， which is ultimately responsible for the prudential policy. 
Third， the DIC is not only to make pay-offs to depositors of the bankrupt 
financial institutions， but also to manage the bankruptcy procedures for trou-
bled financial institutions in line with the rules described in Section IV of this 
paper. The major purpose of the DIC reform is to solve the moral-hazard 
problems of troubled banks by adopting adequate corrective measures against 
those institutions at the earliest timing and ovserving the concrete rules of 
bankruptcy procedures. In order for the DIC to become forceful in perform-
ing such important roles， it must be added the monitoring functions over finan-
cial institutions as well as the functions as the receivers of bankrupt financial in-
stitutions. 
11. The J apanese Accounting System for Financial Institutions 
1. The Current Accounting System 
The J apanese accounting system is based on three c10sely interrelated lega1 
structures consisiting of the Commercial Code (Sho Ho)， the Securities and Ex-
change Law (Shoken Torihiki Ho)， and the Income Tax Laws. The Financia1 
Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises (Kigyo Kaikei Gensoku) works 
as a supplement to provisions of these laws. The Business Accounting Delibera-
tion Council (Kigyo Kaikei Singikai)， an advisory body to the Minister of 
Finance， is charged with formulating accounting standards that furnish useful 
information for investors under the Securities and Exchange Law. The Coun-
cil has also made important contribution to the establishment of accounting 
standards under the Commercia1 Code and various tax laws. 
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Arnong those laws related to the accounting system in Japan， first， the Com-
mercial Code assumes that the interested parties are shareholders， investors， 
and creditors of companies and its main statutory objectives are to calculate 
the profit available for distribution to shareholders and to provide sufficient in-
formation pertinent to the interest of current and future shareholders， inves-
tors， and creditors. Second， the Securities and Exchange Law assumes that the 
interested parties are shareholders and investors and its statutory objective is
to make companies (whose sh紅白 arepublicly traded) disclose information 
which is important for the investment decisions of shareholders and investors. 
Third， the Income Tax Laws assume that the interested parties are tax authori-
ties of national and local governments as well as taxpayers and its statutory ob-
jective is to calculate the taxable income justly and correct1y in accordance 
with taxpayers' ability to pay. As has been just indicated， three laws have difer-
ent statutory objectives， but in fact the accounting standards based on each 
laws are closely interrelated and tied together and are often ca1ed as the 
“Triangular System" in the Japanese Accounting System. 
The accounting standard consistent with the prudential policy based on the 
market disciplines is very much similar to the one of the Securities and Ex-
change Law in the sense that its major purpose is to provide accurate informa-
tion about the management of financial institutions to shareholders， creditors， 
and depositors. However， under the constraint imposed by the “Triangular 
System，" there exist serious problems of the accounting standard of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law in that it does not provide sufficient information for 
shareholders and investors to make investment decisions. The r~lationship 
among three accounting standards can be described as follows. According to 
the Income Tax Laws， on one hand， the taxable income of companies is to be 
calculated by observing incomes reported in' financial statements under the 
Commercial Code. On the other hand， the Income Tax Laws often inc1ude 
detai1ed provisions concerning the calculation of profits and losses， e.g.， credit 
loss allowances， valuation of securities， and depreciation for equipments and 
construction， sothat the calculation of profits under the Commercial Code de-
pend on the Income Tax Laws to a significa 
Problems 01 the Historical Cost Accounting 
Let us quickly review the problems of the current accounting system in 
J apan. First of a1， there exists a rather serious problem of inaccurate asset 
valuation. In principle， the asset valuation in Japan is current1y based on 
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historical cost accounting (hereinafter referred to as “HCA' ')as prescribed by 
the Commercial Code which defines the historical cost as the cost of acquisi-
tion inc1uding acquisition expenses. The objective of this approach is to pre-
vent arbitrary valuation of assets and to prohibit the appropriation of unreal-
ized profits and thereby to maintain sound accounting practices. As an alterna-
tive to the HCA， the valuation by the lower of cost or market (hereinafter 
referred to as“LCM' ')may be applied to some assets such as liquid assets and 
listed bonds and shares. 
The Bank Accounting Standards basically adopt the same rules with 
respect to the valuation of various financial assets as those applied to compa-
nies in general. As shown in Chart 4， listed securities on trading accounts are 
valued by the LCM， but unlisted securities are valued by either the HCA or the 
LCM. As for securities on investment accounts， listed government bonds and 
other bonds are valued by either the HCA or the LCM and in fact most of 
financial institutions in Japan adopt the HCA for evaluating listed government 
bonds. Listed shares and convertible bonds are valued by the LCM， whi1e 
sh町esof subsidiaries副ldun1isted securities are valued by the HCA. 
Accordingly， there occur significant disp町itiesbetween book and market 
values of assets and liabilities held by financial institutions. Since profits are 
realized only by the settlement basis， the realized profits on their financial state-
ments can deviate significantly from their dejacto profits. For example， on one 
hand， their profits can be easily raised through the realization of hidden profits 
of undervalued securities. On the other hand， they can hide valuation losses by 
adjusting securities prices via back-to-back transactions: they may selllisted 
securities (valued by the LCM) at a price over the market price and buy unlist-
ed securities (valued by the HCA) at a price above the market price and thereby 
hide losses associated with securities holdings. As a result， financial statements 
may not reflect the true conditions of financial institutions and it is rather 
dificult for shareholders， creditors， and investors to know the true strength of 
those institutions. 
Another serious problems are generally pointed out in connection with the 
accounting of financial derivatives. The volume of financial derivatives such as 
futures， swaps， and options has increased dramatically in recent years be 
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jun) has been introduced and in that standard the MVA has been adopted in 
the form of converting the value of foreign currency denominated assets at the 
current foreign exchange rates. As for the other derivatives， their valuations 
are based basically on the HCA which cannot grasp the continuously changing 
values of derivatives. 
Problems 01 the Bank Disclosures 
The current disclosure system of Japanese banks is based on the Article 21 
of the Banking Law which stipulates that documents explaining current busi-
ness and tinancial conditions must be available at al major offices of a bank. 
In 1987 the Zengin Federation of Bankers Association (Zenkoku Ginko 
Kyokai) published the uniform disc10sure codes for its member banks， namely 
city banks， regional banks， second-tier regional banks， long-term credit banks 
and trust banks. 
However， the disclosure of information concerning both on-balance-sheet 
and off-balance sheet transactions by those member banks are quite limited in 
scope as fol1ows. They disclose information on their securities holdings by 
dividing them into securities of trading purpose and those of investment pur-
pose. For each category of securities， book values， market values， and unreal幽
ized holding gains and losses are disc1osed. But， specitied moneyes in trust (tok-
kin) and fund trusts， both of which are not classitied as securities under the 
Securities and Exchange Law， are not subject to such disclosure requirements 
and their market values are not disclosed. Besides， since market value informa-
tion for private securities is not disclosed， securities which might have particu-
larly large losses can not be identified. 
Regarding off-balance-sheet transactions， only the market value informa-
tion on listed futures and options is disclosed and the one on over-the園counter
transactions such as swaps is not disclosed. In May 1995， however， the Work-
ing Group on Financial Institutions Disclosure of Financial System Research 
Council published a report concerning the information disc10sure of deriva-
tives， which argue that al types of derivative transactions are to be subject to 
the disclosure requirements and that either market values or fair values of al 
the tinancial instruments， including derivatives， on the trading accounts are to 
be disclosed. 
Meanwhile， the disclosure of banks' non-performing loan assets is quite 
limited. This is mainly because of the provisory clause of Article 21 of the 
Banking Law which relieves banks from disclosing information concerning:“ 
matters which will undermine tinancial order， infringe upon the secrecy of 
depositors and other customers， hamper banking operations unduly， orincur 
an excessive burden of expenses for compilation." As a result， the disclosu 
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banks， long-term credit banks， and trust banks began to disclose the gross 
value of a) c1aims against their customers who went bankrupt (bankrupt loans)， 
and b) claims for which interest payments are more than 6 months past due 
(problem loans)， in1992 in response to the request by the MOF. Regional 
banks and second-tier regional banks are required to disc10se the gross value of 
those bankrupt loans， too， but they are not required to disc10se the amount of 
those problem loans. Furthermore， neither categories of banks are required to 
disc10se the amount of c1aims against customers whose interest payments are 
reduced or deferred (restructured loans) for the time being. 
The more detailed information concerning banks' non-performing loans 
has been collected by the MOF and the BOJ through their on-site examinations 
and/or daily monitorings. The MOF and the BOJ in turn have utilized those in-
formation only for themselves in conducting their roles as financial regulators 
and supervisors under the framework of the “GSG" type of financial adminis-
tration. However， such dominance of the information concerning non予町四
forming loans is not consistent with the prudential policy based on the market 
disciplines， which requires the public disclosure of important information con-
cerning banks' management. Therefore， it should be highly evaluated that the 
more disclosure of information concerning banks' non-performing loans are 
now under study for affirmative answers by the Committee for Financial Sys-
tem Stabilization of the Financial System Research Council. 
2. Market Value Accounting for Financial Institutions 
From the viewpoint of the prudential policy based on the market dis-
ciplines， the current system of the financial accounting and the disc10sure of in圃
formation in Japan should be critically reviewed and in principle the scope of 
financial assets and liabilities which are evaluated by the MV A isto be expand-
ed. The major reason for the expansion of the MVA for Japanese financial in-
stitutions is to grasp their true management conditions by revealing more infor-
mation concerning the market values of their assets and liabilities on the con-
solidated basis and thereby to grasp the accurate value of their net worth. 
The expansion of the MV A in J apan can be considered in the following two 
steps: the first step is to increase the disclosed information of market values of 
financial instruments and the second step is to change the accounting rules 
from the current HCA， with some LCM， into the MV A in principle. By increas-
ing the disc10sure of market value information， we can expect two kinds of 
efects: the feedback effects and the feedforward efects. The former are the the 
effects that shareholders， creditors， and depositors could make a selection 
among financial institutions by utilizing disclosed information， while the latter 
are the effects that managers of financial institutions would take more prudent 
behaviour than otherwise since they must take the feedback effects of the dis-
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closure into account. 
Here the question arises as to for whom the disclosure is to be made. The 
current provisions for disclosure under the Banking Law is not clear in this 
point， but it has been widely argued that financial institutions should make the 
information disclosure to the general public， particularly depositors， sothat 
they could make selections among financial institutions. However， itwould 
not be an easy task for depositors in general to assess the probability of 
defaults of a certain financial institution even if the disclosed information 
would be increased significantly. Rather， the information disclosure should be 
oriented for specia1ists such as analysts of rating agencies and securities 
analysts who could analyze disclosed information and to translate such infor-
mation into a signal which depositors in general could understand easily. Ac-
cordingly， the information disclosure should be sufficiently thorough and 
detailed to be of value to those specialists as well as professional investors. 
The major purpose of changing the accounting rules based on the HCA 
into those based on the MV A isto grasp the net worth of financial institutions 
more accurately. As will be discussed in Section IV， we can expect that the 
necessary cost for solving吐leproblem of a failed financial institution could be 
minimized by adopting the bankruptcy procedures at the earliest timing. For 
that purpose， it is essential to grasp always the level of capital as accurately as 
possible by marking most of financia1 assets and liabilities to the market. In 
other words， hidden profits and losses which have been characteristic with 
Japanese financial institutions should be openly assessed. It can be町guedthat 
the disclosure of information is suffice to grasp the level of capital of financial 
institutions， but the objective accounting rule of calculating the level of their 
capit叫isdesirable since the bankruptcy rules for financial institutions are to de・
pend the calculated capital ratio. 
Finally， it should be noted that the Business Accounting Deliberation Courト
ci1， whose ofice is managed by the Securities Bureau of the MOF， isresponsi-
ble for setting the accounting rules in Japan， whi1e most of financial institu-
tions are under the supervision of its Banking Bureau. Accordingly， it is not 
quite easy to change accounting rules from the viewpoint of the prudentia1 su-
pervision ov町 financialinstitutions since the negotia 
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are separated from those under the various tax laws. 
VI. Bankruptcy Proceedings in Japan 
When a financia1 institution is in serious distress， then it is fli町ess副・Yto 
force it to observe rules concerning the corrective actions by the regulatory 
agencies as well as the bankruptcy proceedings. From many examples in Japan 
and overseas countries， it is evident for troubled financia1 institutions to make 
a last gamble in order to avoid bankruptcies， but such gambles would ultimate-
ly increase the amount of non-performing loans and would attribute higher 
cost to the financial system. At the present moment in Japan， there does not ex幽
ist the uniform rule concerning the bankruptcy proceedings applicable to finan-
cial institutions， and the MOF has been dealing with troubled financial institu-
tions on ad hoc case by case basis， which has caused long delays in many cas田
because of serious contlicts among various interested parties. Therefore， it is 
urgent to make clear rules concerning the corrective actions as well as the 
bankruptcy proceedings as soon as possible. 
In this section we would like to explain the proceedings available under the 
Japanese law designed for or having the effect of relieving or otherwise dealing 
with those banking institutions which are on the verge of bankruptcy. We in-
tend to cover not only the statutory bankruptcy， but also other available 
proceedings and procedures which are designed for or have the efect of reliev-
ing financia11y disabled banks as much as possible. Such proceedings include 
mergers or acquisitions by profitable banks of those other banks which are in 
financia1 distr出s，various proceedings or action which may be taken by a 
regulartory agency for or against banks in financia1 distress， such as temporary 
suspension of their banking business and affairs or permanent termination of 
their banking business licenses. 
1. Applicable Statutes and Bankruptcy Proceedings Categorized 
When a bank is in serious financia1 distress and is unable to continue its bus-
iness in the same way as before. then it will， like any other corporation， natura1-
ly be subject to statutory bankruptcy proceedings under the bankruptcy law， 
which includes the Bankruptcy Act (Hasan Ho， hereinafter referred to as 
“BA")， the Stock Company Reorganization and Rehabi1tation Act (Kaisya 
Kosei Ho， hereinafter referred to as “SCRRA")， the Arrangement Act (Wagi 
Ho) and the related provisions governing corporate reorganization and special 
liquidation proceedings of stock corporaitons included in the Commercial 
Code (Sho Ho). All of those statutory bankruptcy proceedings， ifapplied to a 
bank， have the effect of Iiquidating or reorganizing the bank through a unified 
and blanket lega1 procedures designed to adjust in an equitable manner the 
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rights and interests of al parties who have valid claims against the bank， under 
the supervision of the court. 
All banks are required under Article 4.1 of the Banking Act to obtain and 
maintain a valid banking business license in order to engage or remain in the 
banking business. Their dissolution and 1iquidation procedures are inevitably 
affected by the Banking Act， since the勘1inisterof Finance has the power and 
authority to permanently terminate their banking business licenses under cer圃
tain circumstances therein specified. In addition， banks' business and affairs 
may be affected by the DIA， which provides certain insurance coverage for the 
protection of depositors. 
In addition to the statutory bankruptcy proceedings， there are， ina much 
broader sense， other proceedings which are also designed for or have the effect 
of relieving financially unhealthy banks. Included among them is the merger of 
a bank which is in a financially unhealthy condition into another bank which is 
financially healthy and profitable. Such a merger is subject to the special 
procedural rules set forth in the Banking Act， and the Act Governing Mergers 
between and Conversion of Banking Institutions (Kinyukikan No Gappei Oyo・
bi Tenkan Ni Kansuru Ho)， whose primary purpose is to regulate mergers be-
tween or among two or more banking institutions of different kinds. DIA may 
become operative， among ohter situations， inor near bankruptcy， because， for 
the purpose of faci1tating the liquidation or rehabi1tation of a bank in finan-
cial distress， DIA authorizes and empowers the Minister of Finance to act as an 
intermediary to promote and expedite the merger of the bank into another 
bank or the acquisition by any other bank or banks of al or substantially al its 
assets and/or capital stock shares on one hand， and gives such other bank or 
banks a chance to avai1 themselves of “Financial Assistance" provided by the 
DIC thereunder on the other hand. 
Bankruptcy Prceedings Categorized 
In general， the bankruptcy proceedings， which are designed for or have the 
effect of liquidating or rehabi1tating a financially unhealthy bank， such as a 
bank with an extremely poor equity capital ratio， can be classified into the fol-
lowing three categories: 
(1) liquidation type proceedingsー towind-up a financially unhealthy 
bank and distribute its asets to its creditors and shareholders. Specialliqui-
dation proceedings under the Commercial Code and bankruptcy proceed欄
ings under BA come under this category; 
(2) rehabilitation type proceedings-to reorganize and rehabilitate a 
financially unhealthy bank; 
(3) merger & acquisition type proceedings-to let a bank or banks in a 
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sound financia1 condition to acquire and assume the asets and liabilities of 
a financially unhealthy bank. 
DIA includes intricate provisions regulating the merger of a financially UIト
hea1thy banking institutions into another financia11y hea1thy and profitable in凶
stitutions. Article 59 of DIA states that any banking institution which is finan-
cially hea1thy and profitable and which is going to merge， asthe surviving enti-
ty， with any financia11y unhea1thy banking institutions or acquires al or any 
part of the assets and/or capita1 stock shares of such financia11y unhea1thy 
banking institutions may， inorder to faci1tate such merger or acquisition， re-
quest the DIC to extend “Financia1 Assistance." The term “Financia1 As同
sistance" means， by definition， the donation of cash funds， extension of loans， 
purchase of assets and assumption and guarantee of debts. 
Technica11y speaking， ifthe DIC pays insurance proceeds to depositors of a 
financially disabled bank pursuant to DIA， such decision or payment is solely 
for the purpose of protecting the depositors with a view to maintaining the 
credibility of the nation's financi叫systemas a whole， and it is tota11y indepen-
dedt from the liquidation or rehabilitation of such disabled bank. When the 
“First Class Insurance Risk Situation，" which term is defined to mean suspen-
sion of payment to depositors， occurs with respect to any bank， orwhen “Se・
cond Class Insurance Risk Situation，" which term is defined to mean and in-
clude the termination of the banking business license， adjudication of 
bankruptcy or passing of a resolution of dissolution， occurs with respect to 
any bank， DIA entitles each and every depositor to file an insurance claim with 
the DIC and obtain insurance proceeds out of the DIC's funds to the amount 
of 110 million per depositor. 
Relationsh伊amongVarious Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In Japan bankruptcy proceedings applicable to banks are subject to not 
only the general rules and principles set forth in the Civi1 Code and the Com-
mercial Code， but also to those set forth in three other groups of law: namely， 
a) the Banking Act (in relation to the temporary suspension of the banking bus-
iness and affairs or the termination of a banking business license): b) the 
bankruptcy law ， which includes the provisions of the Code relating to speci叫
liquidation proceedings， BA and SCRRA; and c) DIA (in relation to“Finan-
cial Assistanse" to expedite mergers and acquisitions and payment of insur-
ance proceeds). 
Unfortunately， from the practical point of view， they are very complicated 
in that a) one cause or event which may act as a trigger for any proceedings 
against a bank under one of the three groups of law dose not necess訂i1yso act 
for any proceedings against the bank under any other group of law， which fact 
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often creates a situation where the time to initiate proceedings under one group 
of law has elapsed， but it has not under any of the other groups of law， i.e.， the 
problem of timing difference; b) the parties who are entitled to file a petition 
for or initiate proceedings against a bank or to make decisions thereunder are 
different as from one group of law to another， i.e.， the problem of the lack of 
uniformity in parties; c) there may be cases where two or more proceedings un-
der two or more different groups of laws are pending against one and the same 
bank， either with or without cooperation or coordination between them， i.e.， 
the problem of the cumulative nature of proceedings; and d) how and to what 
extent bankruptcy proceedings， ifinitiated against any bank， will affect the 
bank's banking business license is not altogether clear， i.e.， the problem of un-
certainty. 
2. Cases of Financially Troubled Banks 
Let us briefly review the cases of financially troubled banks in Japan and to 
see how they were actually solved by the MOF in the past. Even under the 
“GSG" type financial administration， we could point out a few of the financia1 
institutions that fel into a distress because of reckless management and the 
other reasons. With respect to those cases， the Banking Bureau of the MOF， 
the supervisor of those financial institutions， tried to solve the problem by forc-
ing those troubled financial institutions to be merged by much larger and/or 
hea1thier financial institutions which had c10se relationships with those trou-
bled institutions on one hand， while the Banking Bureau requested the resigna-
tion of their managers in order to take the responsibi1ty of those failures on 
the other hand. Accordingly， the timing and the way to solve those problems 
were solely dependent on the discretion of the MOF. In fact， asone of the ex-
bureaucrat of the MOF vividly stated (Sakai [1995])， ithas been considered 
that those cases of troubled financial institutions would offer challenging op-
portunities for the MOF bureaucrats to show their administrative ski1s and 
powers. Such traditional way of dea1ing with bankruptcy procedures have 
been maintained within the MOF until quite recently as has been indicated by 
many examples of the“Financia1 Assistance" by the DIC to the troubled finan-
cial institutions as follows: 
In October 1991 ，the Iyo bank， which has its principa1 ofice in Ehime prefec-
ture， received approval from the Minister of Finance of its application for the 
“Financia1 Assistance" to faci1tate its merger with the fai1ng Toho Sogo 
Bank， which had its principal office in Ehime prefecture， too. DIC's Manage-
ment Committee decided to extend the “Financial Assistance" to the Iyo Bank 
in the form of a floating interest loan of 18 bi1ion for a period of 5・yearsat the 
rate equal to the coupon rate of the 10・yearGovernment bonds minus 5%. The 
“Financial Assistance" was implemented on April 1992， by which the Iyo 
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Bank can save interest expenses by as much as 12 billion by the end of the 5-
year period. At the' same time， the Association of Second-Tier Banks im-
plemented a loan of I1 billion in order to support the Iyo Bank. 
In May 1992， the Sanwa Bank， which is one of the city banks and has its 
principal ofi.ce in Osaka， received approval from the Minister of Finance of its 
application for the “Financial Assistance" to faci1tate its merger with the fail-
ing Toyo Shinkin Bank， which had its principal office in Osaka， too. DIC's 
Management Committee met in June and decided to extend the “Financial As同
sistance" (grant of 120 billion) to the Sanwa Bank. The grant was provided on 
October 1992. At the same time， the Industrial Bank of Japan and Zenshinren 
Bank implemented the assistance of 155 billion and 120 bil1ion respectively. 
Meanwhile， most of the branches of the Toyo Shinkin Bank were sold to 22 
Shinkin banks in the region of Osαka. 
In October 1993， the DIC implemented the “Financial Assistance" (grant 
of 126 billion) to the Iwate Bank， which has its principal ofi.ce in Iwate prefec-
ture so that it could take over the business of the Kamaishi Shinkin Bank， 
which had its main 0血cein Iwate prefecture， too. Accordingly， the failing 
Kamaishi Shinkin Bank was dissolved. 
In November 1993， the DIC implemented the “Financial Assistance" 
(grant of I19 billion) to the Credit Union Osak砕Koyowhich merged the fail-
ing Osaka-Humin Credit Union. Both of those Credit Unions are located main-
ly in Osaka prefecture. At the same time， the municipal government of Osaka 
implemented a loan of I10 billion for 15・yearperiod with low interl回tto the 
Credit Union Osaka-Koyo. 
In January 1995， the Tokyo幻'odoBank was established as a new bank 
which would take over the failing Tokyoめ'owaand the Anzen Credit Unions. 
(Both of them had their principal offices in Tokyo.) Its initial capital amounted 
to 121，495 million among which 120 billion were paid by the BOJ， 1900 million 
by the Sumitomo Bank， and ￥595 million by the Zenshinren Bank respectively. 
In March 1995， the Tokyoめ'odoBank received the “Financial Assistance" 
(grant of 140 billion) from the DIC as well as the additional capital injection 
from wide range of private financial institutions. 
In March 1995， the Credit Union Kansai-Kogin， which has its principal 
o血cein Osaka， merged the failing Credit Union Gihu Shogin， which had its 
principal office in Gifu prefecture， and received the “Financial Assistance" 
(gra 
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the same time， the Yokohama Bank and the prefectural government of Kanaga-
wa implemented the assistance of 14.8 billion and 12.5 billion respectively to 
the above Labour Union and the Credit Union Association. 
1n August 1995， the Tokyo Metropolitan Government ordered the Cosmo 
Credit Union to suspend part of its business and announced the scheme for its 
dissolution. According to the scheme， the Tokyoめ'odoBank are to take over 
the business of the Cosmo Credit Union and to receive the “Finacial As-
sistance" equiva1ent to I100 billion from the D1C， a low interest loan of 1100 
billion from the BOJ and a grant of I18 billion from the National Federation 
of Credit Unions. 
1n August 1995， the MOF announced that the failing Hyogo Bank located 
inめlogoprefecture is to be dissolved and that a new bank named “the Midori 
Bank" is to be established in January 1996 in order to take over the business of 
theめlogoBank. The capital of the new bank is planned to be 180 billion， 
which will be collected mainly from private financial institutions. The estimat-
ed loan losses of the Hyogo Bank is about 1790 billion， which is to be covered 
by its capital of I160 billion， the “Financial Assistance" of ￥400 billion from 
the D1C and so on. 
1n August 1995， the municipa1 government of Osaka ordered the Kizu 
Credit Union the suspension of its business， which in turn caused the deposi-
tors' rush against the Kizu Credit Union. The BOJ and the National Federa-
tion of Credit Unions made the emergency loan totaled 1429 billion. The esti-
mated loan losses of the Kizu Credit Union at the end of October 1995 is about 
1850 billion， most of which is to be funded by the “Financial Assistance' ， 
from the D1C. 
The MOF has been involved in al of the above-indicated cases as the u1ti-
mate financial regulator and supervisor in Japan. It is obviously c1ear that the 
traditional way of MOF's solving troubled financial institutions is approaching 
to its limits. Namely ithas become more and more dificult for the MOF to find 
a hea1thy financial institution which could merge a failing institution or take 
over its business since a large number of J apanese financial instituions have re-
cently been suffering from the burden of non-performing loans. It is also obvi-
ous that the MOF's sticking to the traditional case by case procedure has led to 
the serious delay of solving most of the problematic institutions as indicated by 
the above examples. 
3. Improvement of the Bankruptcy Proceedings 
As has been a1ready stated， the bankruptcy proceedings in Japan are quite 
complicated and it is necesary and desirable for the uniform bankruptcy law 
for financial institutions to be acted in the near future. Namely it is very im-
portant to set up the c1ear and objective rules for solving the problem of failing 
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financial institutions at the earliest timing in order to reduce the social cost出-
sociated with bank failures. With respect to the improvement of the current 
bankruptcy procedures for financial institutions， we would like to make argu-
ments about the following three important aspects. 
First， it is necessary to set up objective rules of ordering corrective actions 
against those financial institutions which are in financial distress (and is likely 
to fal into bankruptcy) at the earliest timing. More precisely， the FSA as the 
new regulatory and supervisory agency is to measure the accurate capitallevel 
of individual financial institutions， which are members of the Deposit Insur四
ance System， by applying the MV Aand is to classify financial institutions into 
the groups depending on the capital level such as “well capitalized，"“ade-
quately capitalized， " and “undercapitalized." Accordingly， those financial in-
stitutions which fal into the “undercapitalized group" will be forced to adopt 
the prompt corrective actions which have already been introduced by the FDIC-
IA in the United States. It should be noted here that the FSA should watch 
carefully not only the capitallevel， but also its variance in the near future. In 
other words， the FSA should be always careful about the robustness of finan-
cial institutions under the expected changes of market circumstances. 
Second，社isnecessary to set up the objective rules concerning the start of 
the bankruptcy procedures. Practically， the bankruptcy procedure should be 
automatically applied to those financial institutions whose capitallevels fal be-
low zero (i.e.， negative net worth) in spite of the corrective actions. We can 
find the same kind of procedures in the FDICIA， which require the regulatory 
agencies to c10se financial institutions c1assified as the “critical1y undercapital-
ized" group in principle. 
Third， the DIC should be strengthened as a specialized agency which are to 
be responsible for the bankruptcy procedures of financial institutions. More 
precisely， the major functions of the strengthened DIC are to exercise pay-offs 
to depositors of the bankrupt financial institutions， tocol1ect loans as the 
receiver of those financial institutions，出ldto preserve their assets against the 
creditors. Ultimately the DIC is to dissolve those financial institutions or to 
deal with them by either merger with or take-over by the healthier and/or larg-
er fi 
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Notes 
1) The MOF announced that the total amount of bad loans of Japanese banks at the 
end of September 1995 was 137，390 billion， whose contents were detaHed as fol-
lows: 
(Unit: 1 Billion) 
Total Bankrupt or Restructured 
Bad Loans Past Due Loans Loans 
City Banks 13，094 8，058 5，036 
Long-Term Credit Banks 3，970 2，116 1，854 
Trust Banks 6，296 2，797 3，499 
Regional Banks 4，946 3，288 1，658 
Second開TierRegional Banks 2，789 2，208 581 
Co-operatives including 6，295 5，963 332 
Shinkin Banks， Credit unions 
Total Banks 37，390 24，430 12，960 
In the above-table， the total bad loans consist of bankrupt or past due loans and 
restructured loans. About 2/3 of the restructured loans were those to the Real-Es-
tate Specializing Institutions (Jusen). 
2) The growth rates ofthe real GDP in Japan were 0.3%， -0.2%， and 0.6% in fiscal 
year 1992， 1993， and 1994 respectively. The Government's forecast figure for fiscal 
year 1995 is 2.8%， but it is likely that les than 1 % growth will continue during the 
current year. 
3) Since the banking license was granted to the Okinawa Bank in 1956， no new banks 
have been admitted by the MOF except the Tokyo Kyodo Bank in 1995. 
4) However， the Banking Bureau ofthe MOF issued the“Circular Conceming the Al-
locations of Branches of Financial Institutions" for fiscal year 1995， inwhich the 
qouta of new branches for city banks， long-term credit banks， and trust banks 
were aboIished. 
5) In September 1995 the Banking Bureau of the MOF announced that it would not 
require financial institutions the report about newly developed financial instru-
ments before their sales. 
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Chart 1 The Organization of the MOF 
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Chart 3 New Framework of the Financial Regulation and Supervision 
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Chart 4 Securities Valuation Standards of Banks 
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